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LAUREL FULLER

The Simian Tongue Harvard University Press

Minds are complex artifacts, partly biological and partly social. This book collects together the essays of Daniel Dennett on the philosophy of mind, artificial intelligence and cognitive ethology that appeared in journals from 1984 to 1996.

The Restless Clock Oxford University Press

In 1950, Alan Turing, the British mathematician, cryptographer, and computer pioneer, looked to the future: now that the conceptual and technical parameters for electronic brains had been established, what kind of intelligence could be built? Should machine intelligence mimic the abstract thinking of a chess player or should it be more like the developing mind of a child? Should an intelligent agent only think, or should it also learn, feel, and grow? *Affect and Artificial Intelligence* is the first in-depth analysis of affect and intersubjectivity in the computational sciences. Elizabeth Wilson makes use of archival and unpublished material from the early years of AI (1945–70) until the present to show that early researchers were more engaged with questions of emotion than many commentators have assumed. She documents how affectivity was managed in the canonical works of Walter Pitts in the 1940s and Turing in the 1950s, in projects from the 1960s that injected artificial agents into psychotherapeutic encounters, in chess-playing machines from the 1940s to the present, and in the Kismet (sociable robotics) project at MIT in the 1990s.

Time and Realism MIT Press

Walmsley offers a succinct introduction to major philosophical issues in artificial intelligence for advanced students of philosophy of mind, cognitive science and psychology. Whilst covering essential topics, it also provides the student with the chance to engage with cutting edge debates.

Brainchildren MIT Press

A “wide-ranging, witty, and astonishingly learned” scientific and cultural history of the concept of the capacity to act in nature (London Review of Books). Today, a scientific explanation is not

meant to ascribe agency to natural phenomena: we would not say a rock falls because it seeks the center of the earth. Even for living things, in the natural sciences and often in the social sciences, the same is true. A modern botanist would not say that plants pursue sunlight. This has not always been the case, nor, perhaps, was it inevitable. Since the seventeenth century, many thinkers have made agency, in various forms, central to science. *The Restless Clock* examines the history of this principle, banning agency, in the life sciences. It also tells the story of dissenters embracing the opposite idea: that agency is essential to nature. The story begins with the automata of early modern Europe, as models for the new science of living things, and traces questions of science and agency through Descartes, Leibniz, Lamarck, and Darwin, among many others. Mechanist science, Jessica Riskin shows, had an associated theology: the argument from design, which found evidence for a designer in the mechanisms of nature. Rejecting such appeals to a supernatural God, the dissenters sought to naturalize agency rather than outsourcing it to a “divine engineer.” Their model cast living things not as passive but as active, self-making machines. The conflict between passive- and active-mechanist approaches maintains a subterranean life in current science, shaping debates in fields such as evolutionary biology, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence. This history promises not only to inform such debates, but also our sense of the possibilities for what it means to engage in science—and even what it means to be alive. Praise for *The Restless Clock* “A wonderful contribution—and much needed corrective—to the history of European ideas about life and matter.” —Evelyn Fox Keller, author of *The Mirage of a Space between Nature and Nurture* “Engrossing and illuminating.” —*Nature* “A sweeping survey of the search for answers to the mystery of life. Riskin writes with clarity and wit, and the breadth of her scholarship is breathtaking.” —*Times Higher Education* (UK)

From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds MIT Press

A new view of the metaphysics of time, arguing that the traditional tensed-tenseless debate within analytic philosophy should be seen as the first stage in a philosophical investigation of time, and that the next stage belongs to phenomenology. How

does time pass? Does time itself move, or is time's passage merely an illusion? Analytic philosophers belong, for the most part, to one of two camps on this question: the tensed camp, which defends the reality of time's passage, conceiving the present as “ontologically privileged” over the past and future; and the tenseless camp, which denies time's passage and holds that all events, whatever their temporal location, are ontologically equal. In *Time and Realism*, Yuval Dolev goes beyond the tensed-tenseless debate to argue that neither position is conclusive but that the debate over them should be seen as only the first stage in the philosophical investigation of time. The next stage, he claims, belongs to phenomenology, and, he argues further, the phenomenological analysis of time grows naturally out of the analytic enterprise. Dolev shows that the two rival theories share a metaphysical presupposition: that tense concerns the ontological status of things. He argues that this ontological assumption is natural but untenable, and that leaving it behind creates a new viewpoint from which to study central topics in the metaphysics of time. Dolev shows that such a study depends on the kind of meticulous attention to our firsthand experiences that drives phenomenological investigations. Thus, he argues, phenomenology is the venue for advancing the investigation of time. *Time and Realism* not only analyzes the tensed-tenseless debate, resolving some of its central difficulties along the way, it transcends it. It serves as a bridge between the analytic and the continental traditions in the philosophy of mind, both of which are shown to be vital to the philosophical examination of time.

Brainstorms, Fortieth Anniversary Edition MIT Press

Western philosophy has long been divided between empiricists, who argue that human understanding has its basis in experience, and rationalists, who argue that reason is the source of knowledge. A central issue in the debate is the nature of concepts, the internal representations we use to think about the world. The traditional empiricist thesis that concepts are built up from sensory input has fallen out of favor. Mainstream cognitive science tends to echo the rationalist tradition, with its emphasis on innateness. In *Furnishing the Mind*, Jesse Prinz attempts to swing the pendulum back toward empiricism. Prinz provides a

critical survey of leading theories of concepts, including imagism, definitionism, prototype theory, exemplar theory, the theory theory, and informational atomism. He sets forth a new defense of concept empiricism that draws on philosophy, neuroscience, and psychology and introduces a new version of concept empiricism called proxytype theory. He also provides accounts of abstract concepts, intentionality, narrow content, and concept combination. In an extended discussion of innateness, he covers Noam Chomsky's arguments for the innateness of grammar, developmental psychologists' arguments for innate cognitive domains, and Jerry Fodor's argument for radical concept nativism. [Natural Minds](#) Bradford Books

Daniel C. Dennett began publishing innovative philosophical research in the late 1960s, and he has continued to do so for the past 45 years. He has addressed questions about the nature of mind and consciousness, the possibility of freedom, and the significance of evolution to addressing questions across the cognitive, biological, and social sciences. The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett explores the intellectual significance of this research project, bringing together the insights of eleven researchers who are currently working on themes that are relevant to Dennett's philosophical worldview. Some of the contributions address interpretive issues within Dennett's corpus, and aim to bring increased clarity to Dennett's project. Others report novel empirical data, at least in part, in the service of fleshing out Dennett's claims. Some of them provide a fresh take on a Dennettian theme, and others extend his views in novel directions. Like Dennett's own work, these papers draw on a wide range of different methodologies, from appeals to intuition pumps and scientific data, to turning the knobs on a theory to see what it can do. But each of them aims to be readable, and approachable. And as a whole, the volume provides a critical and constructive overview of Dennett's stance-based methodology, as well as explorations of his claims about mental representation, consciousness, cultural evolution, and religion.

Sweet Dreams MIT Press

An evolutionary and cognitive account of the science behind why we crack up—"one of the most complex and sophisticated humor theories ever presented" (Evolutionary Psychology). Some things are funny—jokes, puns, sitcoms, Charlie Chaplin, The Far Side, Malvolio with his yellow garters crossed—but why? Why does

humor exist in the first place? Why do we spend so much of our time passing on amusing anecdotes, making wisecracks, watching The Simpsons? In *Inside Jokes*, Matthew Hurley, Daniel Dennett, and Reginald Adams offer an evolutionary and cognitive perspective. Humor, they propose, evolved out of a computational problem that arose when our long-ago ancestors were furnished with open-ended thinking. Mother Nature—aka natural selection—cannot just order the brain to find and fix all our time-pressured misleaps and near-misses. She has to bribe the brain with pleasure. So we find them funny. This wired-in source of pleasure has been tickled relentlessly by humorists over the centuries, and we have become addicted to the endogenous mind candy that is humor.

[Exploring the Landscape of the Mind](#) MIT Press

The study of animal cognition raises profound questions about the minds of animals and philosophy of mind itself. Aristotle argued that humans are the only animal to laugh, but in recent experiments rats have also been shown to laugh. In other experiments, dogs have been shown to respond appropriately to over two hundred words in human language. In this introduction to the philosophy of animal minds Kristin Andrews introduces and assesses the essential topics, problems and debates as they cut across animal cognition and philosophy of mind. She addresses the following key topics: what is cognition, and what is it to have a mind? What questions should we ask to determine whether behaviour has a cognitive basis? the science of animal minds explained: ethology, behaviourist psychology, and cognitive ethology rationality in animals animal consciousness: what does research into pain and the emotions reveal? What can empirical evidence about animal behaviour tell us about philosophical theories of consciousness? does animal cognition involve belief and concepts; do animals have a 'Language of Thought'? animal communication other minds: do animals attribute 'mindedness' to other creatures? moral reasoning and ethical behaviour in animals animal cognition and memory. Extensive use of empirical examples and case studies is made throughout the book. These include Cheney and Seyfarth's vervet monkey research, Thorndike's cat puzzle boxes, Jensen's research into humans and chimpanzees and the ultimatum game, Pankseep and Burgdorf's research on rat laughter, and Clayton and Emery's research on memory in scrub-jays. Additional features such as chapter

summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary make this an indispensable introduction to those teaching philosophy of mind, animal cognition. It will also be an excellent resource for those in fields such as ethology, biology and psychology.

[Furnishing the Mind](#) MIT Press

How are we able to understand and anticipate each other in everyday life, in our daily interactions? Through the use of such "folk" concepts as belief, desire, intention, and expectation, asserts Daniel Dennett in this first full-scale presentation of a theory of intentionality that he has been developing for almost twenty years. We adopt a stance, he argues, a predictive strategy of interpretation that presupposes the rationality of the people—or other entities—we are hoping to understand and predict. These principles of radical interpretation have far-reaching implications for the metaphysical and scientific status of the processes referred to by the everyday terms of folk psychology and their corresponding terms in cognitive science. While Dennett's philosophical stance has been steadfast over the years, his views have undergone successive enrichments, refinements, and extensions. The Intentional Stance brings together both previously published and original material: four of the book's ten chapters—its first and the final three—appear here for the first time and push the theory into surprising new territory. The remaining six were published earlier in the 1980s but were not easily accessible; each is followed by a reflection—an essay reconsidering and extending the claims of the earlier work. These reflections and the new chapters represent the vanguard of Dennett's thought. They reveal fresh lines of inquiry into fundamental issues in psychology, artificial intelligence, and evolutionary theory as well as traditional issues in the philosophy of mind. A Bradford Book.

The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett Cambridge University Press

The development of cognitive science is one of the most remarkable and fascinating intellectual achievements of the modern era. It brings together psychology, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, computing, philosophy, linguistics, and anthropology in the project of understanding the mind by modelling its workings. Oxford University Press now presents a masterful history of cognitive science, told by one of its most eminent practitioners.

[Daniel Dennett](#) Springer Science & Business Media

In the early 1890s the theory of evolution gained an unexpected ally: the Edison phonograph. An amateur scientist used the new machine—one of the technological wonders of the age—to record monkey calls, play them back to the monkeys, and watch their reactions. From these soon-famous experiments he judged that he had discovered “the simian tongue,” made up of words he was beginning to translate, and containing the rudiments from which human language evolved. Yet for most of the next century, the simian tongue and the means for its study existed at the scientific periphery. Both returned to great acclaim only in the early 1980s, after a team of ethologists announced that experimental playback showed certain African monkeys to have rudimentarily meaningful calls. Drawing on newly discovered archival sources and interviews with key scientists, Gregory Radick here reconstructs the remarkable trajectory of a technique invented and reinvented to listen in on primate communication. Richly documented and powerfully argued, *The Simian Tongue* charts the scientific controversies over the evolution of language from Darwin’s day to our own, resurrecting the forgotten debts of psychology, anthropology, and other behavioral sciences to the Victorian debate about the animal roots of human language.

Dictionary Of Modern American Philosophers Bloomsbury Publishing

An anniversary edition of a classic in cognitive science, with a new introduction by the author. When *Brainstorms* was published in 1978, the interdisciplinary field of cognitive science was just emerging. Daniel Dennett was a young scholar who wanted to get philosophers out of their armchairs—and into conversations with psychologists, linguists, computer scientists. This collection of seventeen essays by Dennett offers a comprehensive theory of mind, encompassing traditional issues of consciousness and free will. Using careful arguments and ingenious thought experiments, the author exposes familiar preconceptions and hobbling intuitions. The essays are grouped into four sections: “Intentional Explanation and Attributions of Mentality”; “The Nature of Theory in Psychology”; “Objects of Consciousness and the Nature of Experience”; and “Free Will and Personhood.” This anniversary edition includes a new introduction by Dennett, “Reflections on *Brainstorms* after Forty Years,” in which he recalls the book’s original publication by Harry and Betty Stanton of Bradford Books and considers the influence and afterlife of some of the essays.

For example, “Mechanism and Responsibility” was Dennett’s first articulation of his concept of the intentional stance; “Are Dreams Experiences?” anticipates the major ideas in his 1991 book *Consciousness Explained*; and “Where Am I?” has been variously represented in a BBC documentary, a student’s Javanese shadow puppet play, and a feature-length film made in the Netherlands, *Victim of the Brain*.

Mind in Everyday Life and Cognitive Science University of Chicago Press

The *Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers* includes both academic and non-academic philosophers, and a large number of female and minority thinkers whose work has been neglected. It includes those intellectuals involved in the development of psychology, pedagogy, sociology, anthropology, education, theology, political science, and several other fields, before these disciplines came to be considered distinct from philosophy in the late nineteenth century. Each entry contains a short biography of the writer, an exposition and analysis of his or her doctrines and ideas, a bibliography of writings, and suggestions for further reading. While all the major post-Civil War philosophers are present, the most valuable feature of this dictionary is its coverage of a huge range of less well-known writers, including hundreds of presently obscure thinkers. In many cases, the *Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers* offers the first scholarly treatment of the life and work of certain writers. This book will be an indispensable reference work for scholars working on almost any aspect of modern American thought.

The Animal Mind MIT Press

“A supremely enjoyable, intoxicating work.” —Nature How did we come to have minds? For centuries, poets, philosophers, psychologists, and physicists have wondered how the human mind developed its unrivaled abilities. Disciples of Darwin have explained how natural selection produced plants, but what about the human mind? In *From Bacteria to Bach and Back*, Daniel C. Dennett builds on recent discoveries from biology and computer science to show, step by step, how a comprehending mind could in fact have arisen from a mindless process of natural selection. A crucial shift occurred when humans developed the ability to share memes, or ways of doing things not based in genetic instinct. Competition among memes produced thinking tools powerful enough that our minds don’t just perceive and react, they create

and comprehend. An agenda-setting book for a new generation of philosophers and scientists, *From Bacteria to Bach and Back* will delight and entertain all those curious about how the mind works.

Action in Perception Xlibris Corporation

An interdisciplinary and comprehensive treatment of bodily self-consciousness, considering representation of the body, the sense of bodily ownership, and representation of the self. The body may be the object we know the best. It is the only object from which we constantly receive a flow of information through sight and touch; and it is the only object we can experience from the inside, through our proprioceptive, vestibular, and visceral senses. Yet there have been very few books that have attempted to consolidate our understanding of the body as it figures in our experience and self-awareness. This volume offers an interdisciplinary and comprehensive treatment of bodily self-awareness, the first book to do so since the landmark 1995 collection *The Body and the Self*, edited by José Bermúdez, Naomi Eilan, and Anthony Marcel (MIT Press). Since 1995, the study of the body in such psychological disciplines as cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, psychiatry, and neuropsychology has advanced dramatically, accompanied by a resurgence of philosophical interest in the significance of the body in our mental life. The sixteen specially commissioned essays in this book reflect the advances in these fields. The book is divided into three parts, each part covering a topic central to an explanation of bodily self-awareness: representation of the body; the sense of bodily ownership; and representation of the self.

Contributors Adrian Alsmith, Brianna Beck, José Luis Bermúdez, Anna Berti, Alexandre Billon, Andrew J. Bremner, Lucilla Cardinali, Tony Cheng, Frédérique de Vignemont, Francesca Fardo, Alessandro Farnè, Carlotta Fossataro, Shaun Gallagher, Francesca Garbarini, Patrick Haggard, Jakob Hohwy, Matthew R. Longo, Tamar Makin, Marie Martel, Melvin Mezué, John Michael, Christopher Peacocke, Lorenzo Pia, Louise Richardson, Alice C. Roy, Manos Tsakiris, Hong Yu Wong

Causation and Counterfactuals Basic Books

“We the humans pride ourselves to be the most intelligent species of all. Our vanity is in our uniqueness. Our vanity is in our unpredictability. Our vanity is in our rich, vivid and unique mental lives.” Naskar’s *What is Mind?* is a breathtaking investigative odyssey that attempts to resolve the fundamental distinction

between Mind and Matter, with which the philosophers have struggled for millennia. He elucidates in his peerless explanatory ways, how Mind and Matter are not separate after all. They are intertwined in every single aspect of human life. In *What is Mind?* Abhijit Naskar, bestselling author and one of the world's celebrated neuroscientists offers a fascinating account of the cellular building blocks of mind. He boldly reveals, Neuron is to Mind, what Gene is to Life. With a researcher's flair for fresh approaches to ancient questions, Naskar tackles the most controversial problem in the history of philosophy: how physical processes in the brain give rise to our lavishly colored mental lives enriched with ecstasies and agonies?

The Material Image MIT Press

A defense of a version of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness with special attention to such topics as concepts and animal consciousness. Consciousness is arguably the most important area within contemporary philosophy of mind and perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the world. Despite an explosion of research from philosophers, psychologists, and scientists, attempts to explain consciousness in neurophysiological, or even cognitive, terms are often met with great resistance. In *The Consciousness Paradox*, Rocco Gennaro aims to solve an underlying paradox, namely, how it is possible to hold a number of seemingly inconsistent views, including higher-order thought (HOT) theory, conceptualism, infant and animal consciousness, concept acquisition, and what he calls the HOT-

brain thesis. He defends and further develops a metapsychological reductive representational theory of consciousness and applies it to several importantly related problems. Gennaro proposes a version of the HOT theory of consciousness that he calls the "wide intrinsicity view" and shows why it is superior to various alternatives, such as self-representationalism and first-order representationalism. HOT theory says that what makes a mental state conscious is that a suitable higher-order thought is directed at that mental state. Thus Gennaro argues for an overall philosophical theory of consciousness while applying it to other significant issues not usually addressed in the philosophical literature on consciousness. Most cognitive science and empirical works on such topics as concepts and animal consciousness do not address central philosophical theories of consciousness. Gennaro's integration of empirical and philosophical concerns will make his argument of interest to both philosophers and nonphilosophers.

The Diachronic Mind MIT Press

The Diachronic Mind makes an original contribution to current philosophical debates on the nature of personal identity and the reducibility of the mind. It traces traditional problems facing psychological continuity theories of personal identity to the ease with which theorists of personal identity adopt and apply a sometimes naive physicalism about the mind. This novel diagnosis opens that way to new solutions to traditional problems in the debate on the psychological criterion of personal identity. Through these solutions, an unorthodox version of nonreductive

physicalism about the mind-brain relation is developed that avoids the recurrent epiphenomenalism objection to such positions. The book is written in a crisp style that presupposes no more than an elementary knowledge of philosophy. It is intended for students and professional philosophers alike.

Austere Realism MIT Press

Among the entities that can be mentally or linguistically represented are mental and linguistic representations themselves. That is, we can think and talk about speech and thought. This phenomenon is known as metarepresentation. An example is "Authors believe that people read books." In this book François Recanati discusses the structure of metarepresentation from a variety of perspectives. According to him, metarepresentations have a dual structure: their content includes the content of the object-representation (people reading books) as well as the "meta" part (the authors' belief). Rejecting the view that the object representation is mentioned rather than used, Recanati claims that since metarepresentations carry the content of the object representation, they must be about whatever the object representation is about. Metarepresentations are fundamentally transparent because they work by simulating the representation they are about. Topics covered in this wide-ranging work include the analysis of belief reports and talk about fiction, world shifting, opacity and substitutivity, quotation, the relation between direct and indirect discourse, context shifting, semantic pretense, and deference in language and thought.